Noncompetition Agreements in Bankruptcy:

Covenants (Maybe) Not to Compete
Jeffrey C. Sharert

A struggling young soap opera actress is offered a role on a
prime time show on another network.' Unfortunately, she has

over two years left on her network contract, and that contract
contains a noncompetition clause: if she terminates the contract,
she cannot appear on any competing network for six months.
However, just as opportunity is packing its bags, the actress
talks to her attorney, who tells her that she can get around the
restriction in her contract by, of all things, filing for bankruptcy.
Under current case law, whether the attorney is a hero or a heel
depends in large measure on where the bankruptcy petition is
filed.2 Whether bankruptcy should offer such an escape is the
subject of this Comment. It examines whether and when bankruptcy should defeat a nondebtor's right to enforce a covenant not
to compete against an individual debtor.3
The current treatment of covenants not to compete in bankruptcy law is at best a tricky, and at worst an incoherent,
business. The issue of bankruptcy's effect on covenants not to
compete arises most frequently when a trustee rejects an
executory contract4 under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (the
t BA 1992, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 1996, The University of Chicago.
' These facts are based on In re Carrere, 64 Bankr 156 (Bankr C D Cal 1986).
2 Unfortunately for Tia Carrere (who is no longer acting in soap operas and, judging
from her appearances in films such as Wayne's World and True Lies, no longer struggling either), she filed her petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of
California, where the bankruptcy judge denied her motion to reject her three-year contract to perform on the soap opera "General Hospital" so that she could accept a more
lucrative contract to perform on the "A Team." See id at 160.
' Much of the analysis in this Comment-particularly the textual analysis of the
Bankruptcy Code-is germane to both individual and corporate bankruptcies. However,
because space constraints preclude a full treatment of policy considerations peculiar to the
corporate context, this Comment focuses on the enforceability of covenants not to compete
against individual debtors. Moreover, because individual debtors generally file for bankruptcy under Chapters Seven and Thirteen, and only in unusual cases seek protection
under Chapter Eleven, see Douglas G. Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy 5 n 2 (Foundation, 1992), this Comment focuses primarily on the effects of proceedings under Chapters Seven and Thirteen on noncompetition covenants.
The precise definition of the term "executory" has been the subject of some debate.
See generally Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding
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"Code").5 Unfortunately, the myriad complicated questions that
surround § 365 and the treatment of executory contracts in
bankruptcy cloud the central, wholly severable issue: the
dischargeability of a nondebtor's right to enforce a covenant not
to compete against a breaching debtor. However, because § 365
provides the context in which covenants not to compete are most
often examined, and because of the heavy and often misleading
emphasis that bankruptcy judges place on executory contract
principles in determining the continued enforceability of such
covenants, a complete analysis of this topic must begin with a
discussion of the procedural posture in which the issue most
often arises.
Section 365(a) permits a bankruptcy trustee to reject any
executory contract of the debtor. Often, rejected contracts contain
covenants not to compete.7 When a trustee rejects a contract
containing an otherwise enforceable noncompetition covenant, the
debtor-employee commonly acts as if he is no longer bound by the
covenant,8 and the employer commonly seeks to enjoin this
competitive conduct.' Although a bankruptcy trustee possesses

'Rejection", 59 U Colo L Rev 845 (1988); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A FunctionalAnalysis
of Executory Contracts, 74 Minn L Rev 227 (1989); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U Colo L Rev 1 (1991). Most courts
have adopted Professor Countryman's definition, which states that an executory contract
is "a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the
contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." Vern Countryman,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part I, 57 Minn L Rev 439, 460 (1973). See, for
example, In re Oseen, 133 Bankr 527, 529 (Bankr D Idaho 1991). This is also the definition cited in the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. See HR Rep No 595, 95th
Cong, 1st Sess 347 (1977).
' Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-598, 92 Stat 2549, 2574-77, codified
as amended at 11 USC §§ 101 et seq (1988 & Supp 1993).
6 See Westbrook, 74 Minn L Rev at 228 (cited in note 4) ("Bankruptcy is that volume
of the law that might have been written by Lewis Carroll .... In no chapter of that
volume has the law become more psychedelic than in the one entitled 'executory contracts.'").
Covenants not to compete appear in a wide variety of contracts, including, for example, employment contracts, franchise and distributorship agreements, leases and subleases, partnership agreements, and contracts for the sale of businesses. In all cases, a
breach by the covenantor gives rise to certain rights in the covenantee, such as a right to
enjoin the prohibited activity. See generally Kurt H. Decker, 1 Covenants Not to Compete
43-73 (Wiley, 2d ed 1993). For the sake of simplicity, this Comment speaks generally of
employment contracts and the employer's right to enforce a covenant not to compete
against an employee, although the analysis applies equally to other covenant holders.
' See, for example, In re Cox, 53 Bankr 829, 830-31 (Bankr M D Fla 1985) (debtoremployee went to work for competitor of employer).
' When a bankruptcy petition is filed, § 362(a) automatically stays any judicial proceedings against the debtor based on prepetition claims. 11 USC § 362(a) (1988). Although
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the undisputed power to reject executory contracts, many courts
disagree about the effect this rejection and other bankruptcy
processes have on the enforceability of covenants not to compete.10 Moreover, even courts that agree on the enforceability of
such covenants offer varying justifications for their conclusions.11
This Comment attempts to develop a consistent framework
for the treatment of noncompetition agreements in bankruptcy
proceedings. Section I summarizes the relevant provisions of the
Code and the roles these provisions play in the analysis of
noncompetition covenants. It also demonstrates that the current
approach employed by many courts-analyzing the effect rejection has on the nondebtor's right to an injunction-asks the
wrong question and confuses the power of the trustee to reject
the contract with the consequences that flow from that rejection.
Instead, the proper inquiry should examine the effect the bankruptcy discharge has on the nondebtor's rights. Section II examines the current case law in this area, canvassing the various
approaches taken by courts and identifying the flaws in each.
Finally, Section III examines both the policies underlying the
bankruptcy system and the text and legislative histories of
relevant Code provisions. Section III then proposes two solutions
to the noncompetition covenant quandary. First, it proposes a
legislative solution modeled on the Code's treatment of real
property leases and technology licenses. Second, recognizing the
practical difficulty of enacting corrective legislation, the Section
argues that even under the current text of the Code, the right to

this may place a temporary obstacle in the path of an employer seeking to enforce a
covenant not to compete, it is not material to the analysis in this Comment, which is concerned merely with whether the right to enforce the covenant survives the proceedings.
The bankruptcy court has the power, for cause, to grant relief from the stay under §
362(d), and if the employer's right to an injunction is nondischargeable, the court may
grant such relief and permit the employer to pursue its injunction. Moreover, even if the
bankruptcy court does not grant the employer relief from the stay, the employer remains
free to initiate enforcement proceedings at the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding.
"0 Compare, for example, In re Rovine Corp, 5 Bankr 402, 404 (Bankr W D Tern
1980) ("The effect of the rejection was to relieve the [debtor] and its estate of the obligations imposed via the covenant not to compete."), with In re Don & Lin Trucking Co., 110
Bankr 562, 568 (Bankr N D Ala 1990) ("[T]he debtor's rejection of the [ I contract did not
relieve it of the obligation not to compete .... ").
" Compare, for example, Don & Lin Trucking Co., 110 Bankr at 568 (holding that
debtor remains bound by covenant because rejection merely relieves debtor of performance
of burdensome contract provisions but does not relieve debtor of "the effects of such termination"), with Matter of Udell, 149 Bankr 898, 907 (Bankr N D Ind 1992), rev'd, 149 Bankr
908 (N D Ind 1993), rev'd, 18 F3d 403 (7th Cir 1994) (concluding that debtor remains
bound by covenant because right to injunction is not a "debt").
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enforce a covenant not to compete should generally survive
bankruptcy, notwithstanding the. discharge of the debtor's other
legal obligations.
I. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS
At its core, bankruptcy aims to "relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to
start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."' When a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy, the Code prevents his creditors from pursuing collection efforts outside of the bankruptcy proceedings" and
provides a procedural framework for the collective distribution of
some of the debtor's assets to creditors. Upon completion of the
bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor is generally discharged from
personal liability for all prebankruptcy debts. 4
A. The Bankruptcy Code Provisions
1. Section 365: Rejection of executory contracts.
A debtor ordinarily enters bankruptcy possessed of certain
assets, including claims against third parties, and certain liabilities, such as obligations owed to third parties. Broadly speaking,
rights that the debtor has against third parties are treated as
property of the bankruptcy estate under § 541(a), 5 and obligations owed by the debtor are treated as claims against the estate
under § 502.16 Because an executory contract imposing mutual
performance obligations on the debtor and the nondebtor is conceptually no more than the combination of an asset and a liability, it could conceivably be treated under §§ 541 and 502, respectively.'7 However, the Code treats the executory contract as a
special case subject to special rules set forth in § 365.
Section 365(a) provides that the bankruptcy "trustee, subject
to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory con-

Williams v United States Fidelity & GuarantyCo., 236 US 549, 554-55 (1915).
See 11 USC § 362(a). See also note 9.
See 11 USC §§ 727(b), 1328(c).
The bankruptcy estate is composed of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor." 11 USC § 541(a)(1).
"
1

16

11 USC

§

502.

"7The performance owed to the debtor could be treated as property of the estate
under § 541(a), the performance owed by the debtor as a claim under § 502. See Thomas
H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 105-06 (Harvard, 1986).
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tract ... ."" The purpose of § 365(a) is to allow the trustee to
abandon property that is burdensome to the estate.' Thus, the
trustee may assume contracts that it believes will benefit the
estate, and reject contracts for which it believes the costs to the
estate will exceed the benefits. 0
When the trustee rejects a contract, § 365(g) provides that
such rejection "constitutes a breach of such contract... immediately before the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition.... .2 1 Thus, contrary to a view often expressed
or implied in many bankruptcy decisions, rejection does not cause
a contract magically to vanish." The only consequence that
flows from rejection is that the Code treats the contract as if the
debtor had in fact breached it just prior to bankruptcy. The
breach may have its own consequences, but these are not bankruptcy issues; instead, they are created and governed by applicable state or nonbankruptcy federal law.2 3 The crucial point is
that the postrejection rights and obligations of the debtor and the
nondebtor are exactly the same as they would have been had the
debtor first breached the contract and then filed for bankruptcy.
2. Section 502: Allowance and estimation of claims.
Where a nondebtor has a right to an equitable remedy that
in turn gives rise to a right to payment, § 502(c) requires the
bankruptcy court to estimate this right to payment and to allow
it as a claim against the estate.' In effect, the choice between
alternative remedies, which is in the hands of the nondebtor
outside of bankruptcy, is made by the bankruptcy court under §

18

1 USC § 365(a).

Lawrence P. King, ed, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy S 365.01 at 365-16 (Matthew
Bender, 15th ed 1995).
2" See generally Westbrook, 74 Minn L Rev at 266-67 (cited in note 4).
21 11 USc § 365(g).
' "'[R]ejection' is not some mystical power to cause contracts to vanish, nor a power

to terminate, cancel, or repudiate them. It is not even a 'power' to breach them in any
meaningful sense ....Rejection is very simple. It is the estate's decision not to as-

sume... a contract, because the contract does not represent a favorable investment of the
estate's resources. Rejection has the consequence of creating a deemed breach of the
contract as of the date of bankruptcy so that there will be no question but that the
nondebtor party has a claim." Andrew, 62 U Colo L Rev at 8 (cited in note 4). See also

Texaco Inc. v Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 136 Bankr 658, 663-64 (M D La 1992).
' See Butner v United States, 440 US 48, 54-55 (1979); Grogan v Garner, 498 US
279, 283 (1991) (-he validity of a creditor's claim is determined by rules of state law.").
See also In re Audra-John Corp, 140 Bankr 752, 757 (Bankr D Minn 1992) ("State law []
must govern the parties' rights in consequence of a deemed breach under § 365(g) ...
24 11 USC § 502(c)(2).
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502(c). Rather than receiving full satisfaction of his claim in the
form of an equitable remedy (for example, specific performance of
the contract), § 502(c) forces the holder of the equitable remedy
to participate in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate, receiving his pro rata share of the estate based on whatever value the
bankruptcy court estimates and assigns to his equitable right.
3. Sections 727 and 1328: The discharge provisions.
When the debtor successfully completes bankruptcy proceedings, he is granted a discharge of most or all of his
prebankruptcy debts. The relevant provisions in each of the chapters under which a petition can be filed govern the procedure for
obtaining a discharge as well as its scope.2 6 Although there are
some differences in the scopes of the discharges granted under §§
727 and 1328,27 each discharges "debts" of the debtor.2 8 Once
the court discharges a debt, any judgment based on it, regardless
of when obtained, becomes void. Moreover, the discharge enjoins
the commencement or continuation of any action to collect that
debt as a personal liability of the debtor.
In determining the scope of the discharge in Chapters Seven
and Thirteen, the Code draws a rough line between human capital and other types of assets. Specifically, the Code frees the
Furthermore, § 502(g) provides that a claim arising from the rejection of a contract
under § 365 "shall be allowed ...or disallowed... as if such claim had arisen before the
date of the filing of the petition." 11 USC § 502(g). Thus, where state law provides a
damage remedy for breach of the rejected contract, the nondebtor's only recourse is to file
a proof of claim against the estate, 11 USC § 501(a), and get in line with the gas company, the telephone company, and the rest of the debtor's unsecured creditors. See In re
FinancialNews Network, Inc., 149 Bankr 348, 350 (Bankr S D NY 1993).
" See 11 USC § 727 (Chapter Seven); 11 USC § 1328 (Chapter Thirteen). One of the
principal differences between Chapters Seven and Thirteen lies in what the debtor must
surrender to his creditors in exchange for his discharge. In a Chapter Seven proceeding,
the debtor essentially turns over all of his current assets, and bankruptcy frees his future
income from the creditors' claims. In a Chapter Thirteen proceeding, the debtor is allowed
to retain a greater share of his current assets in exchange for some of his future income.
In bankruptcy terms, a Chapter Seven debtor's future income is not property of the
bankruptcy estate, see 11 USC § 541, whereas the income of a Chapter Thirteen debtor is,
see 11 USC § 1306(a)(2).
' For example, whereas § 523(a) enumerates twelve categories of obligations that are
not subject to discharge in Chapter Seven, see 11 USC § 727(b), only three of those are
excepted from discharge in Chapter Thirteen cases where the debtor completes a reorganization plan, see 11 USC § 1328(a)(2). None of the exceptions enumerated in § 523(a)
encompasses obligations arising from an ordinary breach of contract, whether such breach
occurs in fact or by operation of § 365(g). See 11 USC § 523(a).
' See 11 USC § 727(b) ("a discharge... discharges the debtor from all debts"); 11
USC § 1328(a) ("the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts").
' See 11 USC § 524(a).
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debtor's human capital, manifested primarily in future income,
from the burden of preexisting debt.3" In exchange for this relief,
the debtor surrenders many of his current assets for distribution
to creditors."
4. Sections 101(5) and (12): What is a "debt"?
Given that bankruptcy discharges "debts," the definition of
that term is crucial to the postbankruptcy enforceability of any
legal obligation of the debtor. Section 101(12) of the Code3 2 defines "debt" simply as "liability on a claim."3 3 Section 101(5) defines "claim" as a:
(A) right to payment... ; or

3o See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv L Rev
1393, 1396-97 (1985).
3 The Code does not draw this same line where the debtor is a corporation; whereas
an individual's future earnings do not become property of the estate in a Chapter Seven
proceeding, a corporation's future earnings do. See Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy at 94
(cited in note 3). As such, the discharge itself in Chapter Eleven does not put a
corporation's future income beyond the reach of its prepetition creditors. For a discussion
of the purposes and effects of discharge in the corporate context, see id at 62-82.
In addition, as Professor Thomas Jackson notes, the Chapter Thirteen option blurs
the human capital line somewhat by permitting the debtor to pay his creditors out of his
future income. See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1396-97. However, the maximum duration
of a Chapter Thirteen plan is five years, see 11 USC § 1322(c), and Chapter Thirteen sets
the distributions that creditors would receive under a Chapter Seven liquidation as the
minimum value of the debtor's adjustment plan, see 11 USC § 1325(a)(4). Although §
1325(b) requires that all of a debtor's disposable income be applied to the adjustment plan
if any creditor receiving less than full satisfaction of its claim objects, see 11 USC §
1325(b), the fact that the debtor can usually threaten to convert the proceedings to
Chapter Seven often dissuades creditors from objecting to plans that pay them only the
required minimum. See Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy at 55 (cited in note 3). Thus, even
Chapter Thirteen insulates all of a debtor's human capital-that is, future income-beyond the five-year adjustment period, and in many cases, it protects human
capital beyond the value of what the debtor's creditors would get in a hypothetical Chapter Seven liquidation.
3
11 USC § 101(12). The 1990 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Pub L No 101647, 104 Stat 4867, added a new paragraph (3) to § 101 and redesignated, inter alia, the
former paragraphs (3) through (23) of that section as (4) through (24). The amendment
made no substantive changes to any of these paragraphs. Thus, the pre-1990 § 101(4) is
now § 101(5), and the pre-1990 § 101(11) is now § 101(12). Many of the sources discussed
in this Comment reference the pre-1990 Code. For the sake of clarity and consistency, the
Comment refers to all paragraphs of § 101 by their current designations.
' 11 USC § 101(12). The definition of a "debt" as a "liability on a claim" makes clear
that "[t]he terms 'debt' and 'claim' are coextensive: a creditor has a 'claim' against the
debtor, the debtor owes a 'debt' to the creditor." S Rep No 95-989, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 23
(1978), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5787, 5809; Bankruptcy Law Revision, HR Rep No 95595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 310 (1977). See also Pennsylvania Pub Welfare Dep't v Davenport, 495 US 552, 558 (1990).
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(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment ....
Thus, any right to payment enjoyed by a nondebtor as a result of
a breach is a claim and, consequently, a debt. 5 Therefore, any
such right to payment would be discharged under either Chapter
Seven or Chapter Thirteen.16 With respect to equitable remedies, however, no clear answer to the dischargeability question
exists. Judicial construction of § 101(5)(B) in the context of
noncompetition covenants has been inconsistent.3 ' As such, the
case law offers little guidance to a court faced with an employer
seeking to enjoin a debtor's breach of a noncompetition covenant.
B. The Noncompetition Covenant Context
Noncompetition covenants are increasingly common in modern commercial and judicial life.38 A recent empirical study reported that appellate decisions involving such covenants doubled
in the twenty years from 1968 to 1988.3' This study also noted
that "reported appellate decisions are only the tip of the litigation
iceberg.... '[E]xperience tells us that behind every appellate
level decision are many trials where additional related legal
issues are raised but not reviewed.'"4" A typical covenant may

11 USC § 101(5).
See 11 USC §§ 101(5)(A), 101(12).
See 11 USC §§ 727(a), 1328(a).
Compare In re Oseen, 133 Bankr 527, 530 (Bankr D Idaho 1991) (holding that right
to injunction is a claim only when nondebtor has alternative right to payment addressing
same purpose as injunction), with In re Hughes, 166 Bankr 103, 106 (Bankr S D Ohio
1994) (holding that right to an injunction is a claim any time performance requires
expenditure of money by debtor, regardless of whether nondebtor has any right to payment), citing In re May, 141 Bankr 940, 943 (Bankr S D Ohio 1992). Moreover, the Supreme Court has encountered § 101(5)(B) in only two cases, both involving nondebtors entitled to the payment of money. See Ohio v Kovacs, 469 US 274, 282-83 (1985) (holding
that environmental cleanup order was not enforceable in bankruptcy because it had been
converted into an obligation to pay money upon appointment of receiver for debtor's
assets); Johnson v Home State Bank, 501 US 78, 84 (1991) (holding that mortgage interest
that survives discharge of personal liability is a "claim" under § 101(5) because the
mortgage holder "still retains a 'right to payment' in the form of its right to the proceeds
from the sale of the debtor's property").
' See Phillip J. Closius and Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current JudicialEnforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposalfor Reform,
57 S Cal L Rev 531, 532 (1984) ("Because of the increasing emphasis in the American
economy on technically skilled employees and service oriented businesses, the covenant
not to compete has become a standard addition to employment contracts.").
' Empirical Study, A StatisticalAnalysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment
Contracts, 15 J Corp L 483, 484 n 2 (1990).
40 Id at 485 n 8, quoting Arthur J. Sabin, Constructing a Viable Restrictive Covenant

1995]

NoncompetitionAgreements in Bankruptcy

1557

provide that for some period of time following the termination of
the underlying contract and within a certain geographic area, an
employee will not work for one of his employer's competitors 4 ' or
engage in other specified activities, such as soliciting any of the
employer's clients or employees.4 2 Although courts have traditionally disfavored such restraints of trade,' a comment to §
186 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that a
noncompetition agreement is not "unenforceable unless the restraint it imposes is unreasonably detrimental to the smooth
operation of a freely competitive private economy."" As a result,
reasonable covenants not to compete are generally enforceable,4 5
usually through an injunction prohibiting the covenantor from
engaging in the proscribed activity.4 6
When a debtor enters bankruptcy as a party to an employment contract, § 365(a) permits the trustee to reject the contract,
freeing the debtor-employee from the burdensome performance

in Employment Contracts,72 Il Bar J 310, 310 (1984).
41 See, for example, Lee/O'Keefe InsuranceAgency, Inc. v Ferega, 163 IMlApp 3d 997,
516 NE2d 1313, 1315 (1987) (five years and one hundred mile radius).
42 See, for example, In re Cooper,47 Bankr 842, 843-44 (Bankr W D Mo 1985).
E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 5.3 at 335-40 (Little, Brown, 1982). See also
Milton Handler and David E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second)of
Contracts,57 NYU L Rev 669, 721-31 (1982).
" Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 186 comment a (1981) (emphasis added). This
reasonableness standard reflects the need to strike a balance between a policy favoring
freedom of contract and a competing policy disfavoring restraints of trade. See Empirical
Study, 15 J Corp L at 486-87 (cited in note 39). On the freedom of contract side of the
equation, Edward Schulman has recently identified three potentially welfare-enhancing
bargains between employer and employee that may explain the existence of employee
noncompetition agreements: such agreements (1) enable the employee to sell goodwill to
an employer for a wage, without the employer having to worry about the employee leaving the firm and appropriating the goodwill by taking customers away from the firm; (2)
enable the employer to freely share trade secrets and confidential information with the
employee; and (3) permit the employer to spend larger sums training employees, confident
that it will have time to recoup its investment. Edward M. Schulman, An Economic
Analysis of Employee Noncompetition Agreements, 69 Denver U L Rev 97, 102-17 (1992).
' Under the standard presented in the Restatement, a noncompetition covenant will
be enforceable as long as (1) it is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship, (2) the restraint it imposes is no greater than necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate interest, and (3) the promisee's interest is not outweighed by the hardship to the
promisor and the likely injury to the public. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
188(1).
" See Donald J. Aspelund and Clarence E. Eriksen, Employee Noncompetition Law §
8.02 at 8-19 to 8-23 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1994); Dan B. Dobbs, 3 Law of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution§ 12.22(2) at 496-99 (West, 1993). "The firm rule is
that the employer may not specifically enforce an employee's personal services contract.... [However,] the negative promise not to perform those services for others or to
compete with the employer... can be enforced in some cases even when the affirmative
covenant cannot be." Id at 496-97 (footnotes omitted).
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obligations associated with it.4' However, this is not a free pass;
when the trustee rejects the contract it does not cease to exist.
Instead, § 365(g) treats the debtor-employee as having breached
the employment contract just prior to bankruptcy." In addition,
any "claims" that the employer may have under applicable
nonbankruptcy law arising from this breach-for example, a
right to be reimbursed by the employee if the employer has to
pay a higher wage to the employee's replacement-can be asserted against the bankruptcy estate.49 Thus, the employer is entitled to share pro rata in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate, but that is all the employer is entitled to; afterthe pro rata
distribution, the balance of its claims is discharged.
Nonbankruptcy law may give the employer multiple rights as
a consequence of the debtor-employee's breach." Whether a particular right may be asserted against the estate and be discharged depends on whether § 101(5) defines that right as a
"claim." The enforceability of a noncompetition covenant thus
hinges on the categorization of the employer's right to require
compliance. If the right to an injunction enforcing a
noncompetition covenant is deemed a claim under § 101(5), then
all that the employer can do is assert its claim against the estate
under § 502(g), pocket its bankruptcy dollars (paid according to
the court's estimation under § 502(c)), grin, and bear its new
rival. On the other hand, if the right to an injunction does not
meet the definition of § 101(5), then the employer cannot partake
in the distribution of the debtor-employee's assets, but the right
to enforce the covenant survives the debtor-employee's discharge.
As a result, the employer can still hold the debtor-employee to
the terms of the covenant not to compete.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Bankruptcy courts differ greatly on whether nondebtors may
enforce noncompetition covenants during and after bankruptcy.
Some hold such covenants unenforceable.51 These courts gener, See 11 USC § 365(a) and text accompanying notes 4-20.
See 11 USC § 365(g) and text accompanying notes 21-23.
4911 USC §§ 101(5), 502(g).
' For example, the employer may have a right to recover monetary damages caused
by the employee's failure to perform his affirmative duties under the contract, as well as a
right to specifically enforce negative obligations such as a covenant not to compete.
51 See, for example, In re Rovine Corp, 5 Bankr 402, 404 (Bankr W D Tenn 1980)
("Rovine 1); In re Rovine Corp, 6 Bankr 661, 666 (Bankr W D Tern 1980) ("Rovine I/"); In
re Register, 95 Bankr 73, 75 (Bankr M D Tenn 1989), affrd sub nom, Silk Plants, Etc.
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ally invoke the rule that under § 365 a contract must be assumed
or rejected in its entirety. Thus, these courts reason that where a
contract containing a covenant not to compete is rejected, the
covenant is also rejected, and, once rejected, the covenant ceases
to exist and to be enforceable against the debtor.52
Courts holding noncompetition covenants enforceable generally rely on at least one of three grounds to reach this conclusion.
Some hold that the contract at issue is not executory and is
therefore not subject to rejection under § 365. 53 Others reason
that rejection under the Code only affects monetary rights, and
thus does not disturb equitable, nonmonetary rights that arise
because of the breach of contract.' A third approach concludes
that the nondebtor's equitable right is not a "claim" under §
101(5) and is therefore not dischargeable.55
A. Courts Holding Covenants Not to Compete Unenforceable
Courts holding that covenants not to compete are unenforceable in bankruptcy generally invoke the rule that "[a]n executory
contract must be rejected in its entirety or not at all."" In In re
Rovine Corp ("Rovine /), 57 for example, a bankrupt Burger King
franchisee rejected its franchise agreement. When the franchisor
sought to enforce the agreement's covenant not to compete, the
bankruptcy court held that the covenant was executory, and thus

FranchiseSys. v Register, 100 Bankr 360 (M D Tenn 1989).
52 See, for example, Rovine II, 6 Bankr at 666.

See, for example, In re Hughes, 166 Bankr 103, 105 (Bankr S D Ohio 1994) (employment relationship terminated prior to bankruptcy); In re Hawes, 73 Bankr 584, 586
(Bankr E D Wis 1987) (same).
' See In re Carrere, 64 Bankr 156, 160 (Bankr C D Cal 1986) (dicta). See also In re
Thomas, 133 Bankr 92, 95 (Bankr N D Ohio 1991) ("[Elquitable, nonmonetary
rights ...[that arise] as a result of the breach... are not disturbed.").
' See, for example, Matter of Udell, 149 Bankr 898, 905-06 (Bankr N D Ind 1992)
("Udell 1"), rev'd, 149 Bankr 908 (N D Ind 1993), rev'd, 18 F3d 403 (7th Cir 1994); In re
Oseen, 133 Bankr 527, 530-31 (Bankr D Idaho 1991). On the other hand, at least one
court has taken this same approach and concluded that the right to enforce a covenant
not to compete was a "claim" under § 101(5)(B). Silk Plants,Etc. Franchise Sys. v Register, 100 Bankr 360, 362 (M D Term 1989).
In re Rovine Corp, 6 Bankr 661, 666 (Bankr W D Tenn 1980) ("Rovine IT'), citing In
re Klaber Brothers, Inc., 173 F Supp 83 (S D NY 1959). See also In re Allain, 59 Bankr
107, 109 (Bankr W D La 1986) ("[B]ecause the court concludes that the agreement does
not represent several separate contracts the rule that an executory contract must be
assumed or rejected in its entirety precludes the lifting of automatic stay of section 362 as
to the noncompetition clauses.").
57 5 Bankr 402, 403 (Bankr W D Term 1980).
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"[t]he effect of the rejection was to relieve the [debtor] and its
estate of [its] obligation[

.

..not to compete.""8

This "entirety rule" implicitly assumes that once the
noncompetition covenant is rejected, any rights given to the
nondebtor by state law as a consequence of the breach will be
dischargeable.59 However, contrary to this assumption, Congress
neither intended nor provided that all equitable rights would be
dischargeable. This is apparent from § 101(5)(B), in which Congress limited the definition of "claim" in the equitable remedy
context to a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment ....60

Had Congress intended for all equitable rights to be dischargeable, as the entirety analysis implicitly assumes, it would not
have adopted such a qualified definition. Instead, Congress would
have defined "claim" as simply "a right to an equitable remedy."
This conclusion draws support from § 502(c), which requires
the bankruptcy court to estimate for allowance as a claim "any
right to payment arising from a right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance."6 ' Again, had Congress intended that all
equitable remedies be dischargeable, it would not have limited
the bankruptcy court's estimation power to equitable remedies
that give rise to rights to payment. Instead, it would have said
that the bankruptcy court
must estimate for allowance as a claim
"any equitable remedy. " 61
Thus, courts holding that restrictive covenants are unenforceable because "an executory contract must be assumed or
rejected in its entirety""3 accurately state, but misapply, a wellsettled rules and entirely miss the point of §§ 365(g), 502(c) and
101(5). As one bankruptcy scholar has noted, "[r]ejection of the
contract in which [ ] a covenant [not to compete] is contained
should be irrelevant; the determinative issue is the impact of the

Id at 404.
Absent this assumption, rejection would not necessarily relieve the debtor of the
consequences of the breach, and an employer could potentially assert its right to equitably
enforce the covenant.
11 USc § 101(5)(B) (emphasis added).
01
1 USc § 502(c).
See Udell I, 149 Bankr at 903 ("It is circular to argue that the power to estimate
the right to payment arising from the right to an equitable remedy for a breach leads to
the conclusion that the equitable remedy for a breach gives rise to a 'right to payment.' If
this is the result Congress intended, it would have been much simpler and more direct to
define debts and claims as all obligations of the debtor.").
Allain, 59 Bankr at 109.
See King, ed, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 1 365.03 at 365-18 (cited in note 19).

1995]

Noncompetition Agreements in Bankruptcy

1561

debtor's discharge."65 The Rovine I court should have asked
what obligations the breach of the covenant created under state
law, and whether those obligations were subject to discharge. If
they were, then the franchisor would not have been entitled to an
injunction. If they were not, then the franchisor's equitable right
would have survived bankruptcy, and the franchisor would have
been entitled to enforce it.
B. Courts Holding Covenants Not to Compete Enforceable
1. Nonexecutory contracts cannot be rejected.
Some courts have upheld noncompetition covenants by noting that if the contract is not "executory," it does not fall within
the scope of § 365, and therefore cannot be rejected.66 For example, in In re Hirschhorn, a landlord sought to enforce a covenant
not to compete in a debtor-tenant's sublease of office space."
The debtor had already vacated the premises and the landlord
had already terminated the sublease and triggered the covenant
when the sublease was finally rejected." In response to the
debtor's contention that rejection rendered the covenant not to
compete unenforceable, the court held that because "there are no
remaining obligations owed by the parties save for [debtor's]
compliance with the covenant not to compete ...

the noncompete

clause is
not an executory contract which may be reject69
ed ....

The analysis in cases such as Hirschhorn,which focuses on
whether the contract is executory, is misguided. As discussed
above, rejection merely renders a contract breached. ° If a covenant not to compete has already been breached in fact, as it was
in Hirschhorn, rejection is superfluous.7 The court should focus

Andrew, 59 U Colo L Rev at 927 (cited in note 4).
See, for example, In re Hughes, 166 Bankr 103, 105 (Bankr S D Ohio 1994); In re
Oseen, 133 Bankr 527, 529-30 (Bankr D Idaho 1991). Most courts espousing this view hold
that an obligation to abide by a covenant not to compete, standing alone, does not make a
contract executory. See, for example, In re Hirschhorn, 156 Bankr 379, 389 (Bankr E D
NY 1993); Oseen, 133 Bankr at 529.
156 Bankr 379, 382-83 (Bankr E D NY 1993).
e Id at 384-85.
6 Id at 389.
" See 11 USC § 365(g). See also text accompanying notes 21-23.
7' This is likely the case on most occasions when a nondebtor seeks an injunction:
unless an actual breach has occurred or is threatened-that is, unless the debtor is engaging in some conduct harmful to the nondebtor-the nondebtor would probably not
consider it worthwhile to retain counsel and file suit.
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on the disposition of the nondebtor's remedy. By holding a contract nonexecutory when it has already been breached in fact, the
bankruptcy court refuses to recognize what has already occurred
and thus completely dodges the pivotal question: whether the
equitable right arising from the breach survives discharge of the
debtor's debts. Because the injunction is issued on the narrow
premise that § 365 does not apply, rather than on a judgment
that the employer's right to enforce the covenant is
nondischargeable, this approach needlessly prompts future litigation of the latter issue when the debtor violates the injunction,
possibly on the belief that it is dischargeable like the rest of his
debts.
2. Rejection does not affect equitable rights.
Courts holding that § 365 does not affect covenants not to
compete sometimes assert that rejection affects only monetary,
not equitable, creditor rights against the debtor.72 Although this
assertion is commonly dicta, its presence in the case law presents
a trap for the unwary. As noted above, the effects of discharge,
not the fact of rejection, should determine the enforceability of a
covenant not to compete. 3 Technically, the proposition that "rejection does not affect equitable rights" remains correct, because
rejection merely deems the contract breached. State law gives the
nondebtor various remedies; whether such remedies are enforceable following bankruptcy depends in turn on whether they are
discharged. Thus, to state that rejection does not affect equitable
rights merely begs the question of whether such rights survive
discharge.
3. The right to an injunction is not a "claim."
Several courts have properly recognized that the
postbankruptcy enforceability of noncompetition covenants turns
on the dischargeability of the equitable remedies for their
breach.74 These courts ask whether the nondebtor's right to an

' See, for example, In re Carrere, 64 Bankr 156, 160 (Bankr C D Cal 1986); In re
Noco, Inc., 76 Bankr 839, 844 (Bankr N D Fla 1987); Hirschhorn, 156 Bankr at 389.
Compare In re Thomas, 133 Bankr 92, 95 (Bankr N D Ohio 1991) (stating that "equitable,
nonmonetary rights against [debtor] as a result of [prepetition, actual] breach, including
injunctive relief, are not disturbed").
7 See text accompanying notes 64-65.
See, for example, Matter of Udell, 18 F3d 403, 410 (7th Cir 1994) ("Udell lII')
(holding that district court erred in holding that "equitable relief sought by [franchisor]
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injunction is a "claim" under § 101(5)(B), an inquiry whose answer depends both on whether the nondebtor has a right to payment and on the relation of that right to the equitable remedy.7 5
Some courts have construed § 101(5)(B) very broadly, holding
that a right to an injunction is a "claim" any time an obligation's
performance requires the debtor to spend money, regardless of
whether the nondebtor is entitled to any payment.7" However, §
101(5)(B) plainly requires some right to payment in order for an
equitable remedy to be a "claim." That the debtor must spend
money to comply with an injunction does not mean that anyone,
including the nondebtor, has a right to payment.7 7 Other courts
have construed § 101(5)(B) more narrowly, holding that the right
to payment in question must be a perfect substitute for the equitable remedy; that is, the nondebtor must have a choice between
monetary damages and the equitable remedy.7"
An intermediate approach requires some relation between
the right to payment and the equitable remedy, but does not
require perfect substitution. In Matter of Udell ("Udell IIP), an
employer obtained an injunction in state court enforcing a covenant not to compete in a debtor-employee's employment agreement.7" Several days later, the debtor filed a Chapter Thirteen
petition, arguing that the injunction was a dischargeable "claim"
under § 101(5)(B). ° Specifically, the debtor argued that because
the covenant entitled the employer to both an injunction and
liquidated damages, the injunction was a "claim" under §
101(5)(B)."' In essence, the debtor argued that "a right to an

was a 'claim' dischargeable in bankruptcy."); Oseen, 133 Bankr at 530-31.
75 As noted at text accompanying notes 33-37, § 101(5)(B) includes in its definition of
a "claim" a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives
rise to a right to payment ...." 11 USC § 101(5)(B). See, for example, Udell III, 18 F3d at
406-10; Oseen, 133 Bankr at 530-31. Compare In re Aslan, 65 Bankr 826, 828-31 (Bankr C
D Cal 1986) (holding that equitable right to specific performance of contract for sale of
real estate is a "claim" under § 101(5)(B)).
7 See, for example, Hughes, 166 Bankr at 106, citing In re May, 141 Bankr 940, 943
(Bankr S D Ohio 1992).
" If an employee, in order to comply with a covenant not to compete while remaining
in the same business, elects to move to a new city or state, the employee would certainly
have to spend money to effect this move. Nevertheless, it would be ridiculous to assert
that this creates a "right to payment" in the former employer.
" See, for example, Oseen, 133 Bankr at 530-31 (Although state law permitted award
of damages for breach of a covenant not to compete, because "equitable relief serves a
markedly different purpose than damages,.. it is clear that the equitable remedy... did not give rise to a right to payment...
79 18 F3d 403, 405 (7th Cir 1994).
0 Id at 405-06.
" See id at 406; 11 USC § 101(5)(B).
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equitable remedy is a 'claim' whenever the breach of performance
also gives rise to... any right to payment, even one that
serves
82
remedy."
equitable
the
from
purpose
remedial
a separate
The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument. Instead, it held
that an equitable right is a claim only when the nondebtor also
has a right to payment that arises "with respect to" the equitable
right." The court noted that while a right to payment that is an
alternative to the equitable remedy would clearly pass this test,
"relationships
other than outright substitution may also suf84
fice."

Applying this standard to the case before it, the court held
that:
[The] injunction and.., liquidated damages [were] cumulative and not alternative.... [The employer's] right to liquidated damages [did] not arise "with respect to" its right to
an injunction,... the two rights address[ed] entirely separate remedial concerns .... [Thus], the fact that both reme-

dies [were] triggered by a single act [did] not mean that the
right to an injunction [gave] rise to a right to liquidated
damages.85
As a result, the Seventh Circuit held, the bankruptcy judge was
justified in relieving the employer from the automatic stay so
that it could enforce its injunction in state court, and the district
court had erred in reversing that decision on the ground that the
injunction was a "claim" dischargeable in bankruptcy. 6
All of the cases in this Subsection ask the right question: is
the nondebtor's right to an injunction a "claim" and hence dischargeable? Unfortunately, these courts have not agreed on a
consistent standard with which to answer it. As a result, parties
have little guidance in determining before litigation whether the
right to an injunction is a "claim." Following the cases in this
Subsection, the right to an injunction might be a "claim" in any
of the following circumstances: (1) the debtor would have to
spend money to comply,87 (2) the nondebtor has a right to payment that serves exactly the same purpose as the injunction,"
Udell III, 18 F3d at 406.
Id at 408 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id at 409 (emphasis added).
Id at 410.
See Hughes, 166 Bankr at 106.
See Oseen, 133 Bankr at 530-31.
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or (3) the nondebtor has a right to payment that arises "with respect to" the injunction. 9 A solution to this confusion is needed.
Without a clear standard and with only a single appellate decision on point, even minor variations in state law regarding remedies for breaches of noncompetition covenants and their relation
to one another will confuse bankruptcy judges and produce discordant interpretations of § 101(5)(B).

III. NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS IN BANKRUPTCY: THE PROPER
ANALYSIS

A principled treatment of covenants not to compete in bankruptcy should accord with both the normative policies and the
positive text of the Bankruptcy Code. This Section begins by
discussing two fundamental policies that underlie the bankruptcy
system-equality of distribution to creditors and the individual
debtor's fresh start-and concludes that enforcing a covenant not
to compete is at least not inconsistent with either. Next, this Section proposes a legislative path out of bankruptcy's
noncompetition covenant quagmire. Specifically, Congress should
enact a provision analogous to the Code's treatment of real property leases and technology licenses, thereby granting an employer
a right to enforce noncompetition covenants but denying any
other right to specific performance that the employer might have
under state law. However, until Congress enacts such a provision, bankruptcy courts must follow the current Code. Therefore,
this Section concludes by arguing for a textual approach to the
treatment of covenants not to compete, focusing primarily on the
dischargeability of the employer's right to an injunction. Contrary
to the view of many bankruptcy courts, a textual analysis of the
current Code permits the postpetition enforcement of
noncompetition covenants in most cases.
A. Bankruptcy Policies
1. The creditor's concern: equality of distribution.
Bankruptcy provides a collective proceeding for parceling out
an individual's assets to his creditors." A fundamental premise
of this collectivization is that bankruptcy should preserve relative
See Udell III, 18 F3d at 408.
See Jackson, Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law at 9-13, 21 (cited in note 17)
(discussing bankruptcy as a solution to common pool problem of individual debt collection).
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nonbankruptcy entitlements unless something in the shift to a
collective proceeding requires deviation.9 Preservation of relative entitlements means that similarly situated creditors are
treated alike; if the debtor owes the same amount to two unsecured creditors outside of bankruptcy, then they should receive
equal payouts in bankruptcy.2
At first glance, full enforcement of a covenant not to compete
may seem inconsistent with this principle: it gives one unsecured
creditor, the employer, full satisfaction, while other unsecured
creditors receive only a fraction of their due. However, full satisfaction of a noncompetition covenant fundamentally differs from
full satisfaction of a $100 debt or a right to specific performance
that would remove some asset from the bankruptcy estate. Full
satisfaction of these latter claims can come only at the expense of
the debtor's other unsecured creditors. As to monetary claims or
claims that would compel the transfer of estate assets, creditors
play a zero-sum game in which every dollar paid or asset transferred to one creditor comes out of the pockets of the others." To
solve such a game, fairness and the Code demand pro rata distribution.
Full enforcement of a noncompetition covenant against an
individual debtor does not have the necessary collateral consequence of diminishing the payouts to other unsecured creditors. 4 A covenant not to compete affects only the employee's
future opportunities. Such covenants, if they reduce anything,
reduce only future income. In a Chapter Seven proceeding, this
income is not property of the estate and is therefore out of the
creditors' collective reach.95 Even in a Chapter Thirteen proceeding, where the estate includes the debtor's future income, full
enforcement of a noncompetition covenant should normally not
prejudice other creditors. Section 1325(a)(4) guarantees that

91 Id at 21.
' For a discussion of the undesirable consequences of distorting relative entitlements
in bankruptcy, see id at 21-27.
' Although specific performance does not actually require that cash be paid out of
the estate, it does result in the loss of an asset that could otherwise be sold by the trustee. The proceeds of such a sale, which would be divided pro rata among the debtor's other
creditors, are thus lost.
In fact, such payouts would be increased. If the employer's right to an injunction is
treated as a claim against the estate, the bankruptcy court would be required to estimate
its value under § 502(c) and the employer would then be entitled to its pro rata share of
whatever value is assigned. Because of the zero-sum nature of the distribution, this share
would necessarily come at the expense of the other creditors.
'9 See 11 USC § 541.
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creditors in a Chapter Thirteen proceeding receive at least what
they would have received in Chapter Seven." Moreover, even
though § 1325(b) purports to make the debtor "pay until it
hurts," by requiring that all of the debtor's disposable income be
applied to the plan upon the objection of any creditor receiving
less than full payment, the debtor can usually credibly threaten
to convert the proceeding to Chapter Seven. As a result, many
creditors do not object to plans that pay them only the required
Chapter Seven minimum.97 Holding the debtor-employee to a
covenant not to compete does not reduce these payments-indeed, given § 1325(a)(4), it could not. Thus, in neither
Chapter Seven nor Chapter Thirteen does full enforcement of a
noncompetition covenant undermine the principle of equality of
distribution."
2. The individual debtor's concern: a fresh start.
In addition to providing creditors with equal treatment,
bankruptcy also gives "to the honest but unfortunate debtor.., a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of predxisting debt."9

See 11 USC § 1325(a)(4).
Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy at 55 (cited in note 3). Section 1129(a)(7) sets the
same Chapter Seven baseline for payments to creditors in a Chapter Eleven reorganization. 11 USC § 1129(a)(7). However, a corporation cannot threaten as credibly to convert
its Chapter Eleven proceedings to Chapter Seven, because, unlike an individual, who
keeps his exempt assets, receives a discharge, and goes on with his life (albeit less comfortably) at the end of a Chapter Seven proceeding, a corporation has no exempt assets,
11 USC § 522(b), and receives no discharge in Chapter Seven, 11 USC § 727(a)(1). All that
is left of the corporation after a Chapter Seven proceeding is an empty juridical shell. See
Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy at 15. As a result, the managers of a corporation that has
any chance at a successful reorganization will opt for the continued control and operation
attendant to Chapter Eleven, and will not enter Chapter Seven until all hope has run out.
See id at 16. See also note 31.
"8 Because future income is not insulated for a corporation like it is for an individual
(de jure in Chapter Seven, de facto in Chapter Thirteen, see note 31), the full enforcement
of a covenant not to compete against a corporate debtor does have the potential to prejudice other creditors and thereby violate the equality principle. Specifically, if the
corporation's most profitable alternative use of its resources yields a lower return than the
proscribed activity, then enforcement of the covenant would reduce the pool of assets
available for allocation to the corporation's reorganization plan, and concomitantly reduce
the ultimate payouts to the corporation's creditors. In this situation, one must balance the
utility and necessity of covenants not to compete in the corporate context against the risk
of prejudice to creditors not holding such covenants, a task beyond the scope of this
Comment. See note 3.
' Local Loan Co. v Hunt, 292 US 234, 244 (1934). For an excellent discussion of the
normative underpinnings of the fresh-start policy, see Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev 1393 (cited
in note 30).
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Two bankruptcy processes facilitate the individual debtor's fresh
start: the discharge granted by the Code and the rule of Local
Loan Co. v Hunt,' which provides that a debtor's assignment
of his future wages does not survive discharge.'0 '
As a doctrinal matter, one could argue, as Dean Baird has,
that the postbankruptcy enforcement of a covenant not to compete violates the rule of Local Loan by permitting an "ownership
interest in [the debtor's] future income stream" to pass through
bankruptcy." 2 However, unlike the third-party interest in Local
Loan-where the debtor executed an outright assignment of a
portion of his future wages as security for a loan-a covenant not
to compete is not the equivalent of a lien on the debtor's future
income. Rather, the covenant merely narrows the permissible
means by which the debtor can earn that income.0 ° In the example used in the Introduction to this Comment, while the soap
opera actress was temporarily disabled from acting on another
network show, she was free to act on stage, in movies, and in
commercials, and would keep everything she earned in these ventures free of the preexisting claims of her creditors. Because a
covenant not to compete does not amount to an ownership interest in the debtor's future income, its postbankruptcy enforcement
against the debtor does not run afoul of the Local Loan principle.
As a normative matter, one could also argue that any enforcement of a covenant not to compete violates the fresh start
policy by forcing the debtor to carry prebankruptcy baggage into
his postbankruptcy "new ' life. A fresh-start absolutist would urge
that the debtor should leave all prebankruptcy obligations-legal
and equitable-at the courthouse door. However, bankruptcy
does not provide an absolute fresh start. The Code specifically
exempts various types of debts from discharge,"'4 and it denies
"0 292 US 234 (1934).
.01The rule of Local Loan is an exception to the general rule that a creditor's lien survives bankruptcy and remains enforceable against the encumbered property notwithstanding the discharge of the debtor's personal liability for the secured debt. See Long v
Bullard, 117 US 617 (1886). As Dean Baird notes, the Local Loan principle is needed as a
separate element of the fresh start policy because discharge alone affects only "claims"
against the debtor. See Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy at 43 (cited in note 3).
" Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy at 44 (cited in note 3).
103 If the covenant not to compete in an employment contract were so broad as to
prevent the debtor from earning a living, it would be unreasonable as a matter of
nonbankruptcy law. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188(1) & comment c (cited in
note 44); id § 367 comment c (An injunction will not be granted if its probable result will
be to leave the employee without other reasonable means of making a living.).
104 See 11 USC § 523. For example, the Code renders nondischargable any debt for
"willful or malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another
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discharge entirely where
the debtor has engaged in certain types
10 5
of undesirable conduct.
An exception to the fresh-start policy that is particularly
relevant to the analysis of noncompetition covenants is §
523(a)(8), which renders federally funded or guaranteed student
loans nondischargeable.' 5 Congress felt this exception was necessary because students generally have few existing assets but
large future income streams.0 7 In other words, human capital
constitutes the vast majority of their wealth. If student loans
were freely dischargeable, bankruptcy would be relatively painless for recent graduates yet yield substantial benefits, and recent graduates would likely file at a high rate.' Because they
cannot waive the right to discharge, students could not credibly
promise to repay their loans.' 9 The consequence for student
credit would be disastrous-if such loans were available at all,
their cost would be exorbitant. Recognizing the critical role of
student loans in facilitating investment in human capital, Congress narrowed the scope of the debtor's fresh start by carving
out an exception to the debtor's otherwise broad discharge, thereby preserving the availability of such credit."
Just as student loans make it possible for students to invest
in human capital, noncompetition covenants facilitate such investment by employers and employees."' It is generally believed that employees often pay for general on-the-job training-that is, training that is useful to many firms besides the one

entity," 11 USC § 523(a)(6), and any debt for "payment of an order of restitution issued"
in a criminal case, 11 USC § 523(a)(13).
.0.See 11 USC § 727. For example, the Code denies discharge altogether where the
debtor has fraudulently transferred property under certain circumstances, 11 USC §
727(a)(2), and where the debtor has "failed to explain satisfactorily... any loss of assets
or defiiciency of assets to meet the debtor's liabilities," 11 USC § 727(a)(5). See also
Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1440-42 (cited in note 30) (discussing bankruptcy's denial of
access to discharge in order to enforce social norms).
10 See 11 USC § 523(a)(8).
107 See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1430 n 121 (cited in note 30).
108 See id, citing United States Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States, Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: PartII
140 (1973) ("It is not surprising that many students enthusiastically discharged their
student loans before Congress disallowed the practice.").
1" Although a student might be able to solve this problem with a third-party (for
example, a parent) guaranty, the student often needs a loan because his family lacks the
resources to finance the education. It would not be surprising, then, if many of the students who needed such credit would be unable to offer such a guaranty.
. See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1430-31 n 121 (cited in note 30).
. See Paul H. Rubin and Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J Legal Stud 93, 95-100 (1981).

1570

The University of Chicago Law Review

[62:1549

providing it-by accepting reduced wages." However, there are
some types of training for which employees will not or cannot pay
through reduced wages. For example, some training (such as
teaching the details of a trade secret) is so valuable that an employee cannot pay for it through reduced wages."' In such instances employers are reluctant to pay for such training when
the employee could take the training and run." Because an
employer cannot compel specific performance of an employment
contract,"' the employer can ensure that the employee will not
use the acquired training elsewhere only by having the employee
sign an enforceable covenant not to compete. Just as the
student's credible promise to repay loans from postgraduation
income assures his lender that it will recoup its investment and
permits it to extend such loans at an affordable cost to the student, a noncompetition covenant assures the employer that it will
enjoy the fruits of its investment over the course of the employment relationship and thereby reduce the cost of the training to
the employee." 6 If, however, noncompetition covenants were
dischargeable in bankruptcy, the employee could not credibly
make this promise. As a result, such investment either would not
occur or cost the employee more."
In making student loans nondischargeable, Congress found
investment in human capital important enough to justify some
infringement on the debtor's fresh start. Given that
noncompetition agreements likewise facilitate such investment,
permitting the employer's right to enjoin compliance with a covenant not to compete to survive the debtor's discharge is at least
not inconsistent with Congress's vision of bankruptcy's freshstart policy.

112

See Gary Becker, Human Capital 34-40 (Chicago, 3d ed 1993). See also Rubin and

Shedd, 10 J Legal Stud at 93-96.
"
Rubin and Shedd, 10 J Legal Stud at 96 (cited in note 111).
114 Id at 96-97.
See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 367(1) (cited in note 44) ("A
promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced.").
...Although the covenant does not prevent the employee from quitting after being
trained by the employer, it makes it less likely that he will do so by limiting his postemployment opportunities. Moreover, it prevents the employee from exploiting the training by going to work for a competitor willing to pay a higher wage because it does not
have to train the employee itself. See Rubin and Shedd, 10 J Legal Stud at 97 (cited in
note 111).
...This suggests that even though it may be in an individual debtor's own interest to
avoid a covenant not to compete once his financial situation has soured and he has entered bankruptcy, employees as a class, and even the individual debtor, would likely prefer ex ante to have such covenants be nondischargeable.
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B. A Legislative Solution: Treat Covenants Not To Compete Like
Intellectual Property Licenses
In addition to excepting certain debts such as student loans
from discharge, the Code also subordinates the fresh start to
contractual rights in certain types of transactions. This subordination crops up twice in § 365. Section 365(h)(1) protects a lessee
of real property when a bankrupt lessor rejects the lease by giving the lessee a choice between treating the lease as terminated
or remaining in possession of the property for the term of the
lease." Section 365(n) affords similar protection to an intellectual property licensee when a bankrupt licensor rejects a license
agreement." Generally, that section gives the licensee the
choice between treating the license agreement as terminated or
retaining its rights for the duration of the agreement.' Specifically, § 365(n)(1)(B) permits the licensee "to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity provision of such con-

tract, but excluding any other right under applicable
nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such contract) under such contract.., as such rights existed immediately before
the case commenced ....

,",2
Thus, a licensee under an exclu-

sive license agreement can enjoin the trustee or the debtor-licensor from giving the technology to a third party, but cannot get
specific performance of other affirmative obligations-for example, advertising, technical assistance, or legal assistance in a
patent infringement suit-even if state law would provide such a
remedy. 2
The Code's treatment of technology licenses offers considerable insight into a legislative solution for covenants not to compete, especially once the similarities between the two areas are

"' Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-394, 108 Stat 4106, 4128, codified at
11 USCA § 365(h)(1)(A)-(B) (1993 & Supp 1995).
...11 USCA § 365(n). See also Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy, S Rep
No 100-505, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 USCCAN 3200, 3203 ("The
[proposed § 365(n)] provides for treatment of intellectual property licenses under Section
365 in a manner that parallels generally the treatment of real estate leases in... Section
365(h)(1).").
12 11 USCA § 365(n)(1). If the licensee retains its rights, it must make all required
royalty payments and, unlike the real property case, is deemed to waive any right to
setoff and any administrative expense claim arising from performance of the contract. Id §
365(n)(2).
121 11 USCA § 365(n)(1) (emphasis added).
S11 USC § 365(n)(1)(B). See also Note, The Intellectual PropertyBankruptcy Protection Act: The Legislative Response to Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 16 Rutgers Computer & Tech L J 603, 625 (1990).
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recognized. Indeed, the policies that drive the Code's protection of
licensees apply equally to covenantees. The legislative history of
§ 365(n) is particularly illuminating. Prior to the enactment of §
365(n), a bankrupt technology licensor could unilaterally terminate a licensee's rights by rejecting the license agreement.'
The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988
("IPBPA"), which added § 365(n) to the Code, was Congress's
solution to what it perceived to be the unfair results caused by
strict application of § 365 to these cases.'
Its report on the IPBPA reveals that the Senate was particularly troubled by the chilling effect that unilateral termination
rights would have on the use of licensing agreements and on the
overall development of intellectual property.' The Senate was
concerned that the shadow cast by § 365 on a licensee's rights
would discourage the use of licensing agreements and cause parties seeking intellectual property rights to insist on outright
assignment or, if the technology holder were unwilling to assign,
to abandon the transaction altogether. 6 Section 365(n) eliminated the de facto avoiding power that debtor-licensors had acquired under § 365 and gave the licensee the option to retain its
rights under27 the license agreement as they existed just prior to
bankruptcy.

The anti-chilling effect policy embodied in § 365(n) applies
with equal if not greater force to covenants not to compete. If an
employer knows that its employee can avoid a covenant not to
compete in bankruptcy, it might be unwilling to engage in the
transaction that the covenant was intended to facilitate," or, if
'

See, for example, Lubrizol Enterprises,Inc. v Richmond Metal Finishers,Inc., 756

F2d 1043, 1046-47 (4th Cir 1985) (rejection of license agreement permitted so long as not
"taken in bad faith or in gross abuse of the [debtor's] retained business discretion").
124 Pub L No 100-506, 102 Stat 2538, codified as amended at 11 USC §§ 101(52)-(53),
365(n) (1988). For further discussion of the pre-1988 case law and the legislative history
of the IPBPA, see generally Note, 16 Rutgers Computer & Tech L J 603 (1990) (cited in
note 122); Anthony Giaccio, The Effect of Bankruptcy on the Licensingof Intellectual Property Rights, 2 Albany L J Sci & Tech 93, 97-107 (1992); Maijorie F. Chertok, Structuring
License Agreements with Companies in FinancialDifficulty: Section 365(n)-DiviningRod
or Obstacle Course?, 65 St John's L Rev 1045 (1991); Comment, Licenses, Trademarks,
and Bankruptcy, Oh My!: Trademark Licensing and the Perilsof Licensor Bankruptcy, 25
John Marshall L Rev 143, 149-53, 159-65 (1991).
See S Rep No 100-505 at 3-4, 1978 USCCAN at 3202-04 (cited in note 119).
Id.
See 11 USC § 365(n)(1)(B). See also S Rep No 100-505 at 8-10, 1978 USCCAN at
3205-08.
'
For example, the employer might hesitate to invest in specialized training or
disclose sensitive information, even though such training or disclosure would benefit both
parties by increasing the employee's productivity, for fear that the employee will quit and
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it is still willing to bargain, it will seek compensation for the increased risk associated with the potential avoidance of the covenant. 9 This distortion will be particularly severe where the
potential employee is marginally solvent-that is, where the
employer perceives a significant risk of bankruptcy. This in turn
might encourage an employer to screen the solvency of its employees, thereby incurring costs which the employer might try to
recapture (at least in part) by reducing wages.
The potential chilling effect of a de facto avoiding power
might actually be more severe in the context of covenants not to
compete than in the transfer of rights in intellectual property. A
party seeking intellectual property rights could insist on an outright assignment of the technology, thereby avoiding executory
contracts and § 365 altogether. Thus, regardless of § 365, unavoidable transfers of intellectual property rights could still occur. However, no existing mechanism allows an employee to
unavoidably assign his ability to compete. The employer has no
way to protect itself from the misappropriation of the human
capital it bestows upon the employee other than through a covenant not to compete. As long as covenants not to compete can be
negated in bankruptcy, employers cannot ensure that such misappropriation will not occur.
Perhaps the best argument for treating noncompetition covenants like technology licenses and real property leases derives
from the uniqueness of the underlying commodity. In the legislative history of the IBPBA, Congress noted that:
[Tihe problems associated with rejection of executory contracts are common with other special forms of property, such
as real property leases. In both real estate leases and intellectual property licenses, the underlying property is unique.
When the lessee or the licensee is threatened with loss of use
of the property, it is not possible to obtain precise cover from
another source.3 '

go to work for a competitor. See Rubin and Shedd, 10 J Legal Stud at 96-97 (cited in note
111).
' Congress specifically recognized this problem in the technology license context: "If
the creator is unwilling to assign, in some instances, transactions simply are not completed. In others, the licensee discounts what he will pay to account for the risk now seen as
inherent in Section 365. In short, Section 365 is resulting in undercompensationof U.S. inventors." S Rep No 100-505 at 4, 1978 USCCAN at 3203 (cited in note 119) (emphasis
added).
"

Id (emphasis added).
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This resembles the employer's position absent a covenant not to
compete: no alternative source can provide the employer what the
debtor had promised. The employer can replace affirmative obligations, such as a debtor's promise to spend forty hours each
week in the employer's office. The employer can simply hire
someone else to do the debtor's job. As such, affirmative obligations are appropriately dischargeable, and the employer must
assert the replacement costs as a prepetition claim against the
bankruptcy estate.'3 ' However, the negative obligations embodied in a covenant not to compete are different: the employer cannot pay someone else to fulfill the debtor's obligation not to work
for a competitor. Thus, the underlying interest in covenants not
to compete-the negative obligation not to work for a competitor-is as unique as the interest underlying technology licenses
and real property leases. Accordingly, covenants not to compete,
technology licenses, and real property leases should be treated
similarly.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Congress considered
exclusivity provisions important enough to afford them explicit
protection in the text of § 365(n). 2 In a technology license, an
exclusivity provision assures the licensee that it can safely invest
resources in implementing the technology without fear that the
technology will also be licensed to a competitor. Similarly, a
noncompetition covenant assures an employer that it can invest
resources in training and share trade secrets with the employee
without fear that the employee will walk off with the human
capital before the employer can recoup its investment. Furthermore, the licensors cost to comply with an exclusivity provision
in a technology license resembles the cost to an employee of complying with a covenant not to compete. In neither case does enforcement require any affirmative performance or prevent the
debtor from earning a living.1 13 Furthermore, in both cases the
burden lasts only for the term of the contract.
The Senate report on the IPBPA noted that when the Code
was adopted, "[nleither the bar nor Congress then foresaw the
need to protect [ ] the reasonable expectations of intellectual
property licensees."" Given the similarities between covenants

...See 11 USC §§ 365(g), 502(g).
12 11 USC § 365(n)(1) (licensee may retain the "right to enforce any exclusivity provision of such contract").
"'
See note 103 and accompanying text.
S Rep No 100-505 at 4, 1978 USCCAN at 3203 (cited in note 119).
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not to compete and technology licenses, and Congress's express
recognition of the importance of exclusivity provisions in the
latter, Congress probably likewise lacked foresight in the covenant not to compete context. Although Congress should continue
to direct claims arising from breached affirmative performance
obligations into bankruptcy distribution and discharge, it should
remedy its shortsightedness in the noncompetition covenant
context by amending the Code to explicitly permit covenantees to
enforce the negative obligations of covenants not to compete
against individual debtors. Such an amendment would be consistent with the purposes and policies of the Code and with its
treatment of other unique interests.
C. A Textual Solution: A Covenant Not to Compete Does Not
Give Rise to a "Claim"
Until Congress adopts such an amendment, courts must
work within the current framework. Nevertheless, under a proper
construction of the Code, an employer's right to enforce a covenant not to compete should almost always survive bankruptcy.
Although the text of § 101(5)(B) is inconclusive, the legislative
histories of that provision and of § 502(c) as well as relevant
Supreme Court precedent demonstrate that an employer's right
to an injunction should be a dischargeable "claim" only when the
employer also has a right to payment that adequately substitutes
for the debtor's compliance with the injunction. In essence, the
alternative right to payment must be a "price tag" on the equitable remedy. Because injunctions and monetary damages generally serve different purposes, and because injunctions generally
issue only where legal remedies prove inadequate, such instances
of substitution will be rare. Accordingly, noncompetition covenants should generally be enforceable against bankrupt employees.
1. The "plain" language of § 101(5)(B).
At first blush, the text of § 101(5)(B)-which defines "claim"
to include a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment"'s 5 -appears problematic for an employer in any case
where it has a right to collect money from the debtor-employee.

'-

11 USC § 101(5)(B) (emphasis added).
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However, as Justice Frankfurter observed, "[t]he notion that
because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also
plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification. It is a wooden
English doctrine... to which lip service has on occasion been
given here, but which since the days of Marshall this Court has
rejected...

"136 By focusing on whether the breach that creates

an equitable right also creates some right to payment, § 101(5)(B)
could be read to suggest that, in any case where as a result of the
breach an employer is entitled to payment of any sum of money
for any purpose, any equitable remedy to which it is also entitled
would be a "claim."
Congress cannot have intended this. For example, suppose
that a covenant not to compete provides that the employer is
entitled to both an injunction and liquidated damages of ten
dollars per day from the date of the breach through the date of
the injunction. Absent the right to payment created by the liquidated damages provision, the employer's right to the injunction
would clearly be beyond the reach of § 101(5)(B). However, given
that the right to payment exists, a literal reading of § 101(5)(B)
would deem the right to the injunction a "claim" merely because
the same breach triggered both remedies, even though the liquidated damages and the injunction served to remedy two completely distinct harms, and even though the liquidated damages
in no way substituted for or placed a price tag on the injunction.
This approach would also deem a right to an injunction a "claim"
if the employer were entitled to attorneys' fees, a payment wholly
unrelated to any injury caused by the employee's breach. Although the plain meaning of legislation is generally conclusive,
the Supreme Court has held that in cases in which "the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters ...the intention of the

drafters, rather than the strict language, controls."'

7

2. Through the looking glass: the legislative histories of §§
101(5)(B) and 502(c).
The original version of § 101(5) passed by the House of Representatives in HR 8200 defined "claim" as a:

...United States v Monia, 317 US 424, 431-32 (1943) (Frankfurter dissenting).
131 United States v Ron PairEnterprises,Inc., 489 US 235, 242 (1989), citing Griffin v
Oceanic Contractors,Inc., 458 US 564, 571 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
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(A) right to payment... ; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach does not give rise to a right to payment.... . 8
Under this definition, all obligations of the debtor-including
both rights to payment and rights to equitable remedies-would
have been "claims." The report accompanying this bill noted that
it adopted the "broadest possible definition" of the term "claim" so
that "all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or
contingent,
will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy
39
case.
Unfortunately for the debtor-employee, this version of §
101(5)(B) did not become law. Instead, the Senate considered and
passed its own version of § 101(5), which included only rights to
payment and interest thereon and did not include any equitable
remedies in its definition of "claim."' This led to a compromise
between the floor managers of the House and Senate that is the
current § 101(5).' According to Representative Edwards, one
of the co-sponsors of HR 8200:
Section 101[(5)](B) represents a modification of the Housepassed bill to include [in] the definition of "claim" a right to
an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment. This is intended to
cause the liquidation or estimation of contingent rights of
payment for which there may be an alternative equitable
remedy with the result that the equitable remedy will be
susceptible to being discharged in bankruptcy. For example,
in some States, a judgment for specific performance may be
satisfied by an alternative right to payment, in the event
performance is refused; in that event, the creditor entitled to
specific performance would have a "claim!".... On the other
hand, rights to an equitable remedy for a breach of performance with respect to which such breach does not give rise

'

HR 8200, 95th Cong, 1st Sess (July 11, 1977) (emphasis added).

1

HR Rep No 95-595 at 309, 1978 USCCAN at 6266 (cited in note 33) (emphasis

added).
14
S 2266, 95th Cong, 2d Sess (Oct 31, 1977). Curiously, the Senate report accompanying S 2266 merely aped the language from the House report on HR 8200, including the
statement that "[t]he definition also includes as a claim an equitable right to performance
that does not give rise to a right to payment." S Rep No 95-989 at 21-22, 1978 USCCAN
at 5808 (cited in note 33). Nevertheless, it is clear that the definition of "claim" in S 2266
was narrower than the definition of "claim" in HR 8200.
" See King, ed, App 3 Collier on Bankruptcy at IX-1 (cited in note 19).
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to a right to payment are not "claims" and would therefore
not be susceptible to discharge in bankruptcy.'
In contrast with the text of § 101(5)(B), which focuses on whether
a "breach gives rise to a right to payment" and suggests the counter-intuitive results noted above, its legislative history suggests
that the proper inquiry is whether the equitable remedy gives
rise to a right to payment. Specifically, Representative Edwards
stated that an equitable right "with respect to which [right]such
breach does not give rise to a right to payment"' is not a
"claim" under § 101(5)(B).
An example fleshes this out. In the specific performance
hypothetical to which Representative Edwards referred, state law
gives the nondebtor a choice between two remedies: performance
of the contract or compensatory damages. Either remedy puts the
nondebtor in the position he would have occupied had there been
no breach. In effect, the monetary damages place a price tag on
the equitable remedy. In such a case, the nondebtor's claim will
not likely be undervalued in bankruptcy, and so the nondebtor
should share in the pro rata distribution with the other unsecured creditors. On the other hand, if such a price tag were unavailable-where damages were not an alternative for the equitable remedy-then there would be no benchmark by which the
bankruptcy court could value the equitable remedy. Absent a
price tag, then, the nondebtor's equitable right should not be
treated as a "claim."
The text and the legislative history of § 502(c) reinforce this
reading of § 101(5)(B). As noted above, § 502(c) gives the bankruptcy court the power to estimate certain "right[s] to payment
arising from a right to an equitable remedy" for purposes of allowance against the estate.' According to Representative Edwards, the final version of § 502(c) reflected a compromise between the House and Senate proposals, and was "consistent with
an amendment to the definition of 'claim' in section [101(5)](B) of
the House amendment."' Thus, the text of § 502(c), like the
legislative history of § 101(5)(B), suggests that the proper inquiry
is whether the equitable remedy, not the breach of performance,

142 Uniform Law on Bankruptcies, 124 Cong Rec H11090 (Sept 28, 1978); S17046 (Oct

6, 1978) (emphasis added).
14
Id.
11 USC § 502(c). See notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
'
124 Cong Rec H11094, 95th Cong, 2d Sess (Sept 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep Edwards).
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gives rise to a right to payment. Moreover, the legislative history
of § 502(c) suggests that Congress thought this remedy-focused
inquiry was consistent with § 101(5)(B).
Under § 101(5)(B) or § 502(c), the focus of the inquiry regarding the origin of the right to payment-breach or remedy-is
crucial. As noted above, if the focus were in fact on the breach,
then any time an employer had a right to liquidated damages or
even attorneys' fees, an equitable right arising from the same
breach would be a "claim." On the other hand, if the focus were
on the remedy, the fact that an employer had a right to liquidated or even compensatory damages for a harm distinct from that
remedied by the injunction would not bring the right to the injunction within § 101(5)(B).
Although it has never addressed § 101(5)(B) in the context of
a covenant not to compete, the Supreme Court took a remedyfocused approach to § 101(5)(B) in an analogous situation. In
Ohio v Kovacs, the debtor's violation of state environmental laws
had given rise to a stipulation and judgment entry that required
the debtor to both clean up a hazardous waste disposal site and
refrain from further pollution. ' The issue before the Court was
whether the affirmative cleanup obligation was a "claim" within §
101(5)(B). Although the Court held that it was, '47 the Court explicitly noted that its holding did not affect the enforceability of
the debtor's negative obligations." Thus, the Court unambiguously recognized that the debtor's single environmental violation gave rise to multiple, distinct obligations. Notwithstanding
its holding that the affirmative cleanup obligation was a "claim,"
the Court stressed that the negative obligations-which arose
from the same violation and were set forth in the same stipulation and judgment-remained unaffected."19 The most obvious
difference between the negative obligations and the affirmative
obligation to clean up the site was that the latter was capable of
being, and in fact had been, reduced to a monetary obligation.'50 To the extent that a negative obligation not to compete

'
"

469 US 274, 276 (1985).
Id at 283.

"3 "[We do not hold that the injunction against bringing further toxic wastes on the

premises or against any conduct that will contribute to the pollution of the site or the
State s waters is dischargeable in bankruptcy;, we here address... only the affirmative
duty to clean up the site and the duty to pay money to that end." Id at 284-85 (emphasis
added).
14

Id.

. In holding that the cleanup obligation was a "claim," the Court relied heavily on
the fact that the State had appointed a receiver and had instructed the receiver to take
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cannot be monetized, as is ordinarily the case given the highly
speculative nature of the employer's damages, the employer's
equitable right would be in all relevant respects identical to those
that the Kovacs Court specifically excluded from the scope of its
holding.
3. The textual approach to covenants not to compete.
Applying §§ 101(5)(B) and 502(c) in light of the remedyfocused inquiry suggested by Kovacs, a court should find that a
right to an injunction enforcing a covenant not to compete presents a "claim" only when the employer could elect monetary damages in lieu of the injunction, that is, if monetary damages could
compensate for the same future harm that the injunction would
have prevented. However, this will rarely be possible. According
to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "an injunction will not
be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party." 5 ' However, "the inadequacy
of damages is generally not a seriously disputed issue in suits to
enforce noncompetition agreements."'52 Thus, a state court's
holding that an employer is entitled to an injunction to prevent
breach of a covenant not to compete generally implies a concomitant holding that the employer cannot be compensated by monetary damages. The employer does not have an alternative right to
payment for the future injury that the debtor-employee's competition would cause.
Damages are particularly likely to be an inadequate substitute for an injunction as a remedy for a breach of a
noncompetition covenant because an injunction, by its nature,
prevents future continuing harm.'53 Because neither the parties
nor the court know what the future consequences of the debtor's

possession of all of the debtor's property and assets and proceed with the cleanup. Id at
283-84.
"'
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359(1) (cited in note 44).
152 Aspelund and Eriksen, Employee Noncompetition Law § 8.02 at 8-36 (cited in note
46). Aspelund and Eriksen attribute this to two factors: the breach of a covenant not to
compete is often a continuing breach; and the interests protected are often intangible. See
also Comment, Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants in Pennsylvania Employment Contracts, 80 Dickinson L Rev 693, 713 (1976); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v
Hagerty, 808 F Supp 1555, 1559-60 (S D Fla 1992), aff'd, 2 F3d 405 (11th Cir 1993).
" See Aspelund and Eriksen, Employee Noncompetition Law § 8.02 at 8-36, 8-37
(cited in note 46); Black's Law Dictionary 784 (West, 6th ed 1990) (defining "injunction" as
"[a] prohibitive, equitable remedy... forbidding the [defendant] from doing some
act.., or restraining him in the continuance thereof.... Generally, it is a preventive
and protective remedy, aimed at future acts, and is not intended to redress past wrongs").
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unlawful competition will be, they will find it extremely difficult
to set a price for them."s Damages, on the other hand, are effective compensation for past harms: the parties and the court
are able to ascertain the precise extent of the injury that has occurred and place on it a fully compensatory price tag.155
It is noteworthy that the example in the legislative history of
§ 101(5)(B) of an equitable remedy that could be a "claim" was
specific performance, rather than injunction.' 5 Because an order for specific performance generally requires an affirmative act,
it will often be subject to valuation in a way that an injunction is
not. When the court is aware of the precise boundaries of an
affirmative obligation, it can compare the position the nondebtor
would have occupied if performance were completed with the
position the it would occupy if it were not.
CONCLUSION

The current status of covenants not to compete in bankruptcy law is quite murky. Until clarified, parties entering into such
covenants cannot predict whether the covenants will stand or fall
when the covenantor goes broke. Moreover, the tendency of
courts to get lost in the executory contract maze of § 365, and
their failure to recognize that discharge is the proper place to
wrangle over the enforceability of noncompetition covenants, only

'" See In re Norquist, 43 Bankr 224, 225 (Bankr E D Wash 1984) ("Under well settled
principles of common law the breach of [noncompetition] covenants is deemed to create
damages too speculative for accurate calculation.").
"=Although courts do in some cases award "future" damages, such as the present
value of future lost earnings in wrongful discharge actions or future lost wages and "pain
and suffering" damages in personal injury or wrongful death actions, such awards actually
compensate for the future consequences of a past harm, not for some harm that has not
yet occurred. Moreover, courts frequently have concrete evidence from which to calculate
these "future" damages: the employee's salary at the time of the wrongful discharge or the
decedents income at the time he was wrongfully killed. On the other hand, when an
employer seeks to enforce a covenant not to compete, it seeks to prevent future harms
from occurring. As the Restatement notes: 'The breach of a covenant not to compete may
cause the loss of customers of an unascertainable number or importance ....
In such
situations, equitable relief is often appropriate." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 360,
comment b (cited in note 44).
" Although specific performance is actually a type of injunction, an order for specific
performance is generally an order compelling the defendant to do some affirmative act,
such as convey a piece of property or deliver some unique good, whereas an injunction
generally orders the defendant to refrain from doing something. Black's Law Dictionary
defines "specific performance" as "[tihe actual accomplishment of a contract by a party
bound to fulfill it," Black's Law Dictionary at 1138 (cited in note 153), whereas it defines
an "injunction" as a "prohibitive, equitable remedy... forbidding the [defendant] from doing some act," id at 784.
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further confuses the inquiry. As long as this confusion persists,
employers may hesitate to invest in the human capital of their
employees, and employees will be forced to work for wages lower
than they would receive if they could credibly promise not to
compete.
The best way out of this quandary is for Congress to amend
the Bankruptcy Code to afford covenants not to compete protection similar to that afforded real property leases and technology
licenses. Given the difficulty of legislative solutions, however, this
Comment offers an alternate path, based on the language and
legislative history of the Code, that permits the enforceability of
covenants not to compete. Whether one gets there through the
Congress or the courts, this result is consistent with, if not required by, both the text and legislative histories of the relevant
provisions of the Code and the normative underpinnings of bankruptcy law in the United States.

